

Music nationalism and transnationalism in the 'New Global Order'

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The coming apart of 'nation' and 'state' in recent years has meant that both, in Arjun Appadurai's words, have become 'one another's project'.¹ The extent to which this coming apart might be attributable to 'globalization', or a consequence of 'the new global order', and thus considered a recent phenomenon is debatable. Such terms imply the newness of processes that may be considerably older. They imply a 'global' domain of operation and benefit, which may turn out to be significantly more restricted in scope. And they imply a teleology of emerging (if not already achieved) 'order', a notion that may well appeal to some, but might also be questioned by those many who find themselves marginalized, excluded and disoriented.

Recent music study has provided insights into the cultural dynamics of nations, nationalisms and states where, formerly securely yoked together, they now appear to have parted company. This article considers three contrasting examples. The first, a piece of con-

¹ Arjun APPADURAI, «Disjuncture and Difference in the Global Cultural Economy», in Jonathan INDA and Renato ROSALDO (eds.), *The Anthropology of Globalization*, Oxford, Blackwell, 2002, p. 55. This article was originally presented as a keynote talk for the May 2003 Annual meeting of the Portuguese Musicological Association in Lisbon, devoted to the discussion of 'music nationalism and internationalism'. Thanks to Professors João Soeiro de Carvalho and Salwa Castelo-Branco for the invitation, and for preliminary discussions that shaped this paper.

temporary musical folklore, raises the question of music in situations of war and violence, when one nation's music is projected onto another national space. The second concerns a new musical genre in my adopted city of Chicago, and the question of national identification amongst migrant workers far from home. The third draws on my own fieldwork in Istanbul in the 1980s and 1990s, where the Turkish state played a significant role in fashioning not a musical nationalism, but a musical cosmopolitanism. These three case studies all bear on the evergreen topic of 'musical nationalism and internationalism'. The title of this article connects the much discussed question of music and its relationship with nationalism to broader questions rooted in globalization theory. These, I believe, complicate the question, though in productive ways.

Firstly, the musical folklore, a story taken from the Manchester Guardian, 20 May, 2003, filed by Julian Borger.² It is worth quoting in full.

Metallica is latest interrogation tactic

US military interrogators are using unorthodox musical techniques to extract information about weapons of mass destruction of fugitive Ba'athist leaders from their detainees – a fearsome mix of Metallica and Barney the Dinosaur.

The Americans have long been aware of the impact of heavy metal music on foreign miscreants. They blared Van Halen (among other artists) at the Panamanian dictator Manuel Noriega when he took refuge in the Vatican embassy in Panama City, and blasted similarly high-decibel music at Afghan caves where al-Qaida fighters were thought to be hiding.

Now it is reported that the combination of high-voltage rock and happy-smiley children's songs can break the will of the hardest terrorist or rogue element.

² www.guardian.co.uk/international/story/0,3604,959478,00.html

'Trust me, it works', a US 'operative' told Newsweek magazine.

'In training, they forced me to listen to the Barney I Love You song for 45 minutes. I never want to go through that again.'

US interrogators routinely employ 'stress-and-duress' techniques, including sleep deprivation: treatment which human rights activists describe as a form of torture.

'Prolonged sensory deprivation and prolonged sensory over-stimulation can cause intense suffering. You can torture someone with psychological pressure', said Dinah PoKempner of Human Rights Watch.

Ralph Peters, a former colonel in army intelligence, called heavy metal 'the American equivalent of sending bagpipes into battle'.

'Anything you can do to disconcert someone is going to help', he said. 'But it's a myth that torture is effective. The best way to win someone over is to treat them kindly.'

Newsweek quotes a Sergeant Mark Hadsell explaining the qualities of heavy metal that bends the will of US enemies.

'These people haven't heard heavy metal before. They can't take it. If you play it for 24 hours, your brain and body functions start to slide, your train of thought slows down and your will is broken.'

'That's when we come in and talk to them.'

Whether the story is true or not is somewhat irrelevant. Let us take it, instead, as piece of contemporary American folklore, whose subject, the flow of music across violently demarcated political and cultural boundaries is of relevance to our topic. Like all folklore, it circulates by all means available, and grows in the telling. At the time of writing, I have two different versions of the Guardian's account on my e-mail, and heard it orally from a third source that same day. Like all folklore, its moral and essential narrative elements are simple – hence its virus-like capacity to lodge itself in the memory and to compel its listeners to pass the story on to somebody else (as, indeed, I

am doing right now). But, like all folklore, which is collectively authored and reflects its passage through various different sites of reception and performance, it fragments, puzzles, and invites complicated questions when one stops to think about it.

The story implies that some kind of cultural transaction is taking place. We are not simply talking about a psychological technique designed to break down resistance and extract information. The story implies two somewhat contradictory elements in this cultural transaction. Firstly it implies that the music will succeed in frightening the enemy *because* it is alien and incomprehensible. Secondly, it implies that the music succeeds in being frightening because its messages will somehow be understood *despite* the existence of a significant cultural boundary. In as much as 'A' is the case, the story seems to offer a psychologically comforting reversal. Since 9/11,³ 'we' have been frightened by the 'noise' of what 'we' regard as an alien and threatening culture. The occupation of Iraq at last gives us an opportunity to do the same to them (the story might be taken as suggesting). 'B' suggests a battle of cultures, in which 'ours' proves the more mighty, the more natural because it is capable of impressing its meanings across cultural boundaries. B's logic also evokes a broader historical context of cultural imperialism, in which this incident appears as a small chapter in the ongoing story of the West imposing itself on the rest.

The story's current liveliness owes much to its humor, of course, and this adds to its complexity. It depicts a listless tormentor so sure of his powers and capabilities, and so bored in his unchallenged exercise of them, that he is obliged to build into his torments mind-games purely for the purposes of his own entertainment. The analogy linking Metallica with Scottish bagpiping in times of war is also full of heavily ironic humor. The enemies of the Scottish clans had, after all, the option of running away and never hearing the cursed sound of

³ '9/11' refers by month and day to the crashing of two hijacked planes into the World Trade Center on 11 September 2001 in act of terrorism apparently planned by Osama Bin Laden.

the bagpipes again. Iraqis have no such option: *Barney the Dinosaur* and Metallica are there to stay, whether Iraqis want it or not, to be joined in short order, no doubt, by Starbucks, the Fox TV network, Walmart and McDonalds.

The real cultural energy of this story, I suggest, derives from the musical genres in question. Many interpretations of the story are possible, of course, but in liberal middle-class America (my own particular corner) the genres in question elicit a significant degree of cultural embarrassment. Heavy Metal, particularly that represented by Metallica, speaks to many in the liberal middle classes of violence and domination, of white over black, of men over women, of technology over nature. It is often used as the sound track in pornographic films and in advertisements for unnecessarily powerful cars. It says 'we are free to do whatever we like and take pleasure in that freedom'. *Barney the Dinosaur* projects another American fantasy, a childish multi-cultural utopia, where kids of various racial and ethnic backgrounds teach one another songs and dances under the watchful eye of a somewhat sinister purple dinosaur. So, on the face of it, the story presents to its liberal middle class readers and listeners a darkly ironized picture of the distorted circulation of the key American national virtues: the untrammelled right to self-expression on the one hand, and caring, multicultural liberal democracy on the other.

There is a detail in this story that one might dwell on a moment more. The role of the *Barney the Dinosaur* theme music grows more complex as one stops to think about it. When American children grow out of Barney and start kindergarten, they enter a remarkably widespread infantile subculture, a phenomenon that surely deserves study. In this subculture, they learn to sing the very songs they have learned from Barney to words of their own invention in which Barney is subjected to acts of unspeakable violence. The words to the original music are as follows, sung to the tune of 'This Old Man':

I love you
You love me
We're a happy family
With a great big hug and kiss from you to me
Aren't you glad you love him too?

My own children provided me with the following:

I hate you
You hate me
Let's chase Barney up a tree
With a baseball bat we'll hit on the head
Aren't you glad that Barney's dead?⁴

This phenomenon might be understood in terms of what psychoanalysts call abjection: children split off psychic elements constitutive of their sense of 'self' and learn to hate them in the process of gaining a grown-up identity. But, as psychoanalysis also teaches us, the process is ambivalent and unstable. The abject is, actually, a fundamentally non-rejectable part of the self and the relationships that sustain it, hence its peculiar and compelling properties, and the ongoing and uneasy struggle, through adulthood, to reconnect with what has been so decisively and viciously rejected. So another way of reading the story is to see it as a parable of abjection. It might then be taken as portraying the contempt with which American society

⁴ Those who have not outgrown the habit contribute to (in this context) the interestingly named web-site, *The Jihad to Destroy Barney* (see www.jihad.net/main.html). It includes a page of links to academic articles. One includes the following haiku, which I pass on to give an idea of the site's contents:

Barney, he must die
All else is irrelevant
Can't wait 'till he croaks

One should note that the opening and closing theme music of the TV program are different. It is impossible to tell which is being referred [?] to in the article. Violent versions of both seem to be well-known to children of around this age (5-8). For the originals, see <http://home.att.net/~tvthemelyrics/barney.htm>.

now seems to hold its own founding liberal principles. It might suggest an analogy between this contempt and the contempt with which the four-year-old child comes to regard Barney, and also to the humiliation of Iraqi detainees. That is to say, the story might be taken as evoking an unstable and immature act of self-assertion, one ultimately bound to do more harm than good in the long run.

This story provides an angle on something relatively little discussed in the ethnomusicological literature on globalization, under which general heading it surely belongs. The work of Mark Slobin, Veit Erlmann, Thomas Turino, Philip Bohlman, Tim Taylor and Steven Feld⁵ on this subject in recent years has proceeded from a series of interlinked assumptions and arguments. These are that the nation-state can no longer be privileged as the framework and guiding assumption in analysis; that most of the techniques, methodologies and epistemologies in the study of culture are predicated on the nation-state; and that new techniques, methodologies and epistemologies are needed, to be shaped by a new set of guiding metaphors, such as 'cultural flow', 'circulation', and so forth.

This literature also responds to critiques of globalization theory, which might be summarized as follows. Firstly, and empirically, attention has been focused almost exclusively on the circulation of musical forms across the Atlantic, with a strong emphasis on the Anglo-Saxon world, its colonies and dependencies. Other forms of transnational circulation which do not involve 'the West' are ignored, and this leads to the idea that 'globalization' is at root what a previous generation used to call 'westernization'. Secondly, the insistent bifurcation of glo-

⁵ I refer primarily to Mark SLOBIN, *Subcultural Sounds: Micromusics of the West*, Hanover, University of Wesleyan Press, 1993; Philip V. BOHLMAN, *A Very Short Introduction to World Music*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2003; Viet ERLMANN, *Music, Modernity and the Global Imagination*, Oxford, Oxford University Press; Thomas TURINO, *Nationalists, Cosmopolitans, and Popular Music in Zimbabwe*, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 2000; Timothy TAYLOR, *Global Pop: World Music, World Markets*, London, Routledge 1997; and Steven FELD, 'Schizophrenia to Schismogenesis: On the Discourses and Commodification Practices of 'World Music' and 'World Beat'', in *Music Grooves*, Charles Keil and Steven Feld (eds.), Chicago, University of Chicago Press, pp. 257-89.

bal process and local place has lead to a fetishization of locality as the sole site of cultural authenticity and creativity. Those sites of production associated with 'global process' (government agencies, media institutions and so forth) are removed from the purview of ethnographic analysis. This leads to the misleading view that the processes and agencies of globalization cannot *themselves* be understood in terms of their cultural dynamics, only the *effects* of these processes on localities. And thirdly, the metaphor of flow and circulation stresses connections and the creation of new linkages and articulations, all viewed in the light of their politically transformative potential.⁶ How 'flow' and 'circulation' might also culturally marginalize and *disconnect*, an obvious consequence of globalization for many, becomes difficult to understand.

My views on what we need, at this point, spring obviously enough from this brief critique of recent globalization literature. We need more systematic accounts of transnational musical circulation in other domains, for instance in East Asia, in various Pacific regions, in Latin America, in Europe (strangely neglected) and across the South Atlantic. We need more ethnographic analyses of sites of self-consciously 'global' production, for instance in the media industries, elucidating the myths, models and suppositions about culture and its circulation that guide them.⁷ And we need to think about music making that gets marginalized by forms of global flow and circulation. We need continued attention to people excluded by global flows. This is not necessarily the same thing as the 'micromusics' described by Mark Slobin, since these are, at least in part, shaped by global flows. There are parts of the world in which people are not able to travel, and do not have access to telephones or radios, let alone computers or CDs. In musical terms, at least, they are not part of the globalized musical

⁶ George LIPSITZ, *Dangerous Crossroads: Popular Music, Postmodernism and the Poetics of Place*, London, Verso, 1994.

⁷ See, for instance, David HESMONDHALGH, «International Times: Fusions, Exoticisms and Anti-Racism in Electronic Dance Music», in Georgina Born and David Hesmondhalgh, *Western Music and its Others: Difference, Representation and Appropriation in Music*, Berkeley, University of California Press, 2000, pp. 280-304.

world, at least as imagined by many of its theorists. Their situation is, of course, a result of broader global processes, though these can operate to marginalize and exclude, rather than connect.⁸ Marginalization is systemic, and as ethnomusicologists, we are, or should be, devoted to a systemic understanding of things.

What sites are appropriate to this task? The first I hope I have already suggested through my first example. The use of music in contemporary situations of war and ethnic violence would repay careful study for what it can tell us about the cultural dynamics of today's nationalism. Wars and situations of violence are complex sites of symbolic exchange, in which music is used to terrify, to humiliate, to purge and purify, and teach moral lessons about the relationships between the warring parties. By definition, such situations tell us about national identification precisely as it is relocated beyond the nation-state, projected onto territory and populations claimed aggressively and violently. Nationalism in today's world, has, indeed largely become a defensive and reactive process, sustained by fears of external aggression or pollution. The innate violence and psychic instability of nationalism has, as a consequence, become much more visible and obvious than before.

Empirically grounded discussions of music making in situations of ethnic/national violence can be found in Svanibor Pettan's important work on music in the Yugoslav wars.⁹ Serbian accordion bands, one gathers, were marched through the predominantly Croatian towns in one of the very first acts of symbolic violence after Serbian occupation in the Bosnian war. They can also be found in Katy Radford and Neil Jarman's recently published writings on loyalist marching bands in Belfast, Northern Ireland. Its symbolic valence as musical rape

⁸ A point made forcefully in James FERGUSON, «Global Disconnect: Abjection and the Aftermath of Modernism», in Jonathan Inda and Renato Rosaldo (eds.), *The Anthropology of Globalization: A Reader*, Oxford, Blackwell, 2002, pp. 136-153.

⁹ See Svanibor PETTAN (ed.), *Music, Politics and war: Views from Croatia*, Zagreb, Institution for Ethnology and Folklore Research, 1998.

is significantly complicated, as Katy Radford point out, when women's contribution to the world of loyalist musical culture is taken into account. Conventional ethnographic fieldwork in these kinds of situation is extremely difficult.¹⁰

Border-zones constitute a second site. To schematize greatly, we might detect three phases in the history of border-zone cultural study, a tradition of study that is in some ways rather abstract.¹¹ First scholars would regard the border as line separating two cultures. What crossed borders, whether people, commodities or ideas, was believed to change in definable ways as they moved from one center to another. Secondly, the border came to be seen as a privileged zone of contact and exchange, a site of cultural creativity and dynamism, not simply a space of transition. Thirdly, at the current moment, 'the border' seems to have simply disappeared in the critical literature. It is, as it were, a state of mind, evoked at will, that structures interaction and exchange in a complex variety of locales, but that resist representation on a two-dimensional map.

What I think we need are empirical accounts of musical activity in border-zones that are alive to all of these possibilities, but are reluctant to generalize on the basis of some kind of putative post-modern condition. An example is provided by Helen Simonett's recent book, on the subject of Banda, sometimes called Technobanda.¹² This is a raucous and cheerful music that has thrived in Mexico's northwestern cities, and in Los Angeles and Chicago over the last ten years. I like this book for various reasons, not least because it's a music I have come to know and love. I do my weekly shopping trips in

¹⁰ See Katherine RADFORD, «Drum Rolls and Gender Rolls: Women's Marching Bands in Belfast», *British Journal of Ethnomusicology*, vol. 10, 2, 2001, pp. 37-59 and Neil JARMAN, *Material Conflicts: Parades and Visual Display in Northern Ireland*, Oxford, Berg, 1997.

¹¹ My orientations on this subject come from the various contributions to Thomas WILSON and Hastings DONNAN (eds.), *Border Identities: Nation and State at International Frontiers*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1998, and, for music, Manuel PENA, *The Texas-Mexican Conjunto: History of a Working Class Music*, Austin, University of Texas Press, 1985.

¹² Helena SIMONETT, *Banda: Mexican Musical Life Across Borders*, Hanover, Wesleyan University Press, 2002.

Cicero Avenue, on Chicago's South Side, driving through a large neighborhood inhabited almost exclusively by migrants from the Mexican North West. I tune my car radio to a local station, La Ley 107.9, since this broadcasts more or less continuous technobanda, and the music cheers me up as I do a task I don't particularly enjoy. If I wind down my window at a traffic light, I will notice that the radios in many other cars, mostly driven by men in Stetsons and cowboy boots, are tuned into the same station. Occasionally I have seen and heard a heavily amplified banda playing in somebody's garden off 55th street: a house party of some kind, possibly a wedding. I enjoy this momentary sonic alignment of car radio and urban geography, and enjoy reflecting on the profound, yet poorly understood, entanglement of Anglo-Saxon and Hispanic culture in North America.

Simonett shows how Banda has changed and accrued new meanings as it circulates north and south of the border. Firstly, she explains, the rise of right-wing American hostility to Mexicans north of the border has pressured the immigrant community, and created a climate of tension between long-settled Mexican immigrants and newcomers. These latter have consequently felt a strong need to mark their own distinction and cultural capital through cuisine, dress, dance and music. Technobanda, one of a variety of *norteño* hybrids that emerged in the Fonorama studios in Guadalajara in Northern Mexico, came to serve that need, flourished in the southern Californian clubs and bars frequented by the new immigrants. It is associated with a style of dress (stetsons and cowboy boots), a particular rhythmic motion (*el ritmo de caballito*) and a dance, the *quebradita*, a kind of polka/two-step for couples.

Bands from small towns south of the border, particularly in the province of Sinaloa, came into high demand north of the border. Sinaloense bands are deemed particularly 'authentic', though they are themselves a peculiar hybrid. Bands in this part of the world developed in imitation of nineteenth century French and U.S. military bands and adapted to the widespread culture of polka playing for social dancing initiated by Central

European migrants widespread across North Mexico, Texas and the Midwest (the so-called 'polka belt'). Contemporary Sinaloense bands have adapted to the new tastes and contexts of performance north of the border, notably adding amplification and a vocalist, singing words derived from *ranchero*. So in some respects it has come to resemble other *norteño* styles (e.g. *conjunto*). This self-consciously 'modern' sound has, in turn, secured the valuable patronage of drug smugglers in small towns south of the border, who used the new *banda* style to celebrate their cross-border exploits as modern 'social bandits'. Singers south of the border have added new lyrics to the genre with a narrative touch known as '*narco-corridos*'. And these have added an exotic and dangerous touch to the genre which has been warmly received north of the border. Each movement south and north of the border has, in other words, profoundly shaped and animated the genre.

The genre, moreover, has evidently done different things to Mexican national identification both north and south of the border. In cities like Los Angeles and Chicago it is appropriated by people who are increasingly inclined to think of themselves as Mexicanos and Mexicanas, rather than Chicanos and Chicanas, Latinos and Latinas. It has *focused* and *intensified*, in other words, a distinct sense of Mexicanness amongst immigrants, rather than diluting it in more general and inclusive categories of belonging. It can thus be seen as having contributed to the various ways in which the America of the melting pot is being changed into the America of the patchwork quilt, everybody in their own protected space in small and nationally-demarcated areas.¹³

South of the border, its effects on national identification are quite distinct. It has dislodged mariachi music, which became, through complex ideological operations, the privileged symbol of Mexican folk musical identity heavily promoted by the state in the 1930s. Technobanda attained a significant following in Mexico City in the mid 1990s, particularly amongst new rural-

¹³ Chicago exemplifies the process perhaps better than any other city in the United States.

urban migrants, to the dismay of the old cultural elites and middle-class cosmopolitans, I gather. It has been picked up by numerous local radio-stations, and has rapidly become a nation-wide phenomenon. Old images of a Mexico for the Mexicans, promoted by the state, are being replaced by a more complex image of Mexican-ness, one firmly focused on the previously marginalized north-west and the lives of Mexicans in the United States, and thus touching on uncomfortable but pressing political and economic realities.

So-called 'global cities' constitute a third locale in which we might explore the musical ramifications of the disentanglement of nation and state. Here the state apparatus is increasingly concerned not with producing 'national culture', but various forms of cosmopolitanism. This is often imagined *in opposition* to the previous generation's cultural nationalism. The process is particularly evident in the way new elites have attempted to re-fashion and direct emerging practices in urban musical culture.

Ethnomusicologists, along with anthropologists, used to understand cities in a particular way. They were seen, first and foremost, as disciplinary sites, where peasants and tribes, bought into their ambit, learned to be properly national, and, simultaneously, to be properly modern. Musically speaking, local cultures were subsumed by the national, or granted a place within national culture as museum exhibits. In learning national musical culture, or learning to subordinate local practice to it, people learned how to imagine the wider whole, where it came from, and where it was going. Ideally, they might also learn modern and disciplined habits of cultural consumption, literacy and meaning-making along the way. This describes, to a large degree, how elites in many third world countries understood urbanization in the 1950s and 1960s. Ethnomusicologists often absorbed and replicated their ways of seeing things.¹⁴

¹⁴ Bruno NETTL (ed.), *Eight Urban Musical Culture: Tradition and Change*, Urbana, University of Illinois Press, 1978, is a distinguished representative of this way of considering cities.

A different theoretical paradigm is now emerging. This can perhaps best be summed up using anthropologist Mayfair Ma-Hui Yang's notion of re-cosmopolitanization, a notion deployed in a study of transformations in city life in Shanghai in the early 1990s. Many, in this city have used the relatively recent liberalization of Shanghai's cultural space to turn to Taiwanese musical culture and movies from Hong-Kong (known generically as *gangtai wenhua*). And this, in turn, has resulted in a disentanglement of the tight knot that once held Chinese nationalism, the Chinese Communist State, and a particular Chinese experience of modernity together. Re-cosmopolitanization is a catchy and useful term, despite its extreme length, since it clearly has resonance in other places in which a previous generation's cultural nationalism is being rejected or revised. It suggests a possible turn to a more benign and inclusive cultural politics. It suggests urban life as pleasurable cultural exchange, rather than discipline, order and the constant threat of alienation and anomie. It suggests a new kind of civic duty for the intellectual, but one less onerous and stressful than that assumed by the third-world urbanite of the 1950s and 60s. After all, who wouldn't want to be cosmopolitan? Who would want to resist the process of re-cosmopolitanization?

Let me examine the notion, briefly, with reference to my own experience of re-cosmopolitanization in Istanbul in the 1990s. This is one that bears significant similarities to what was happening in Shanghai, at least according to Yang's analysis. In Istanbul, the city was being remodeled as a 'global city', interestingly, by an Islamist municipal government.¹⁵ It was a complex and contradictory process. It involved promoting its cosmopolitan, Levantine past. It involved zoning it for pleasure and leisure as well as business and industry. It involved the massive construction of roads and bridges to facilitate this zoning. Significant state resources were devoted to the task of turning Istanbul into a 'global city'.

¹⁵ For an informative collection of essays on Istanbul at its high point of globalization and Islamization, see Çağlar KEYDER (ed.), *Istanbul: Between Global and Local*, Lanham, Rowman and Littlefield, 2002.

Musically re-cosmopolitanization involved the creation of new sites of music consumption, namely rock-bars, discos and clubs, and the emergence of a style of Turkish pop to cater for it. It involved the marginalization of Arabesk, rural-urban migrant's music of the 1970s and 1980s. It involved the emergence in recorded and other public forms of music associated with Istanbul's Levantine minorities, particularly Greeks, Armenians and Jews (an important means by which the Islamist municipality could claim their liberalism and civility). And, finally, it also involved the emergence of kinds of music adapted for neo-Islamic festivities, weddings, and so forth.

The Islamist municipality was keen to return Istanbul to its late nineteenth century glory. But this raises vital questions. What exactly was the relationship between the forms of cosmopolitanism that prevailed then and those imagined now? There are of course significant differences, which the notion of a continuous cosmopolitan culture in Istanbul does much to obscure. Firstly, the 'new' cosmopolitanism (let me call it 'neo-cosmopolitanism') has emerged in a climate of hostility to the nationalism that prevailed between the 1920s and 1980s. The 'old' cosmopolitans, between, say, the 1880s and the 1920s could not be hostile to nationalism, since there wasn't really a politically dominant nationalism to be hostile to. Today's neo-cosmopolitanism is about negating nationalism, and not simply a matter of being urban, modern and aware of the world around one, as, one might say, the case was a century earlier. To put it simply, today's neo-cosmopolitans have a fundamentally different political project.

Secondly, the old Levantine cosmopolitanism thrived in a free-wheeling laissez-faire world, before the emergence of states that claimed much of a monopoly over either economies or culture. Today's neo-cosmopolitanism is state-directed. It is not, simply, an organic response to collapsed state projects, or defunct nationalisms. States, particularly on the periphery, need to do what they can to channel global finance and investment in their direction, and do so in competition with one another. Today's neo-cosmopolitanism is, in many contexts, actively

manufactured and directed by nation-states seeking ways of inserting themselves into the global economy.

The term re-cosmopolitanism suggests amiable civility, but it should also alert us to a clash of interests and the play of power across urban space. This, too, was very much in evidence in Istanbul in the 1990s, and music provided an interesting vantage point. Both young bohemians and Islamists benefited from the new climate of liberalism. However, the Islamists objected to the short skirts, the rock-bars and the hashish culture of the young bohemians, much in evidence in the world of Turkish rock and pop. The young bohemians, on the other hand, could not stand the restrictions on live music imposed by the Islamist municipality, the seemingly increasing volume of mosque amplification systems, and an aggressive culture of public Islamic moralism. Complex conflicts emerged over nightclub noise in the vicinity of mosques, for instance around Ortaköy, a major night-clubbing center on the Bosphorus shores during this period.

Beyoğlu, Taksim and Tarlabası, in the heart of Istanbul's business district, were once places in which men could listen to Arabesk, drink beer or raki, watch belly-dancers and pick up prostitutes. Large boulevards were driven through the heart of this area, physically destroying many of the music clubs, brothels and cheap restaurants selling soup to late-night carousers. Rental prices rocketed. Formerly dark and dingy alleyways such as Çicek Pasajı were renovated, and turned into places fit for '*kravatlı beyefendiler*' ('gentlemen in ties'), as Recep Tayyıp Erdoğan, then Istanbul's mayor, now Turkey's Prime Minister, once put it. Poor people had no place in the city's new center, and the cultural forms that had served them were banished to the margins once again.

In short, Istanbul's 'global city' status, and the nostalgic neo-cosmopolitanisms with which it is associated, had an agenda: the facilitation by the nation-state of global financial flows for the benefit of its new managerial class. However, culturally speaking, it was not an entirely orderly process. Music performance, along with other kinds of symbolic activity,

exposed conflicts, between Islamists and bohemians, between rich and poor, between Turks and Kurds (whose ethnic struggles continued to be actively silenced during this period). Music created flashpoints of tension not easily dispersed.

Where does this leave us with our general topic of globalization? Globalization, whatever many things this word might mean, has surely complicated the question of belonging, our persistent quest and yearning in modern life. I think all my examples have suggested that both nationalism and the nation-state continue to play an important role in structuring our senses of belonging, even where 'globalization' leads us to expect the reverse. I think they also suggest the peculiar energies released in a situation in which nation and state are significantly out of alignment. Gellner suggested we understand nationalism as an ideological mechanism reconciling the complex cultural relations in a given territory to the administrative practices of the modern state.¹⁶ For him nationalism was a way of making states believable, compelling, pleasurable, even. His own examples spring from a moment in which nation and state were in a significant state of alignment. That is no longer the case: nationalism needs to be explained beyond the borders of the nation-state, and the state's involvement in the production of 'global', rather than narrowly 'national' culture, now needs to be considered. I think these examples also stress the importance of the specific and the empirical. The study of nationalism and globalization has been dominated by people writing with strong, yet, I believe, unexamined presuppositions about the universality of modernity or post-modernity, and, consequently, strongly normative senses of what nationalism on the one hand and globalization on the other should be.

Finally, I believe, my examples suggest we consider the specificity of music, that peculiar way of relating to other people through sounds, as a means of shaping social and cultural worlds. In the act of shaping these worlds, in performance, in other words, we complicate the worlds we

¹⁶ Ernest GELLNER, *Nations and Nationalism*, Ithica, Cornell University Press, 1983.

imagine, and, through round-about routes, come to recognize these complications. We introduce an unwelcome recognition of our dependence on those others we wish to forget about or exclude. We introduce the possibility that others might find ways of participating in the pleasures we wish to keep purely for ourselves. We build selves and identities in performance, but expose their precariousness and their entanglement with others, and thus build self-knowledge, too. How we *act* on that knowledge is a significantly more complicated matter in the so-called new global order, and one that will continue to challenge ethnomusicologists and others interested in nations and nationalism in the modern world.